David Chalmers is a well-known philosopher who is best known for his work on the philosophy of consciousness. He has been involved in several debates over the years, but one of the most recent ones was around his views on panpsychism.
Panpsychism is the idea that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe and is present in all matter. In a debate with philosopher Philip Goff in 2019, Chalmers defended his view that panpsychism is a viable solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
This view has a long history in both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions and has recently gained popularity in analytic philosophy. Panpsychism is seen as a middle ground between physicalism and dualism, as it avoids the disunified nature of dualism and the inability of physicalism to explain the emergence of consciousness. Despite sounding strange, panpsychism provides a satisfying account of the human mind within a unified conception of nature.
Hard problems and easy problems
The "hard problem" of consciousness is different from the "easy problems" of explaining how the brain integrates information or categorizes environmental stimuli. The easy problems are functionally definable, meaning they are definable in terms of what they allow a subject to do. Experience, on the other hand, does not seem to fit this explanatory model. Even if we find something that plays the causal role of pain, we can still ask why the particular experience of hurting is associated with that role. These problems are classified as hard problems. Cognitive models and neural correlates of consciousness might play important roles in a comprehensive solution, but they might not solve the hard problem itself.
Panpsychism and the hard problem of consciousness
The hard problem of consciousness is the question of how subjective experience arises from physical processes in the brain. Chalmers argues that panpsychism is a promising solution to this problem because it posits that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of the universe, rather than an emergent property of complex systems like the brain.
However, Goff disagreed with Chalmers' view, arguing that panpsychism is not a scientifically plausible solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Goff maintains that there is no empirical evidence to support the existence of consciousness in fundamental physical entities.
The debate between Chalmers and Goff highlights the ongoing discussion and disagreement among philosophers about the nature of consciousness and how it arises from physical processes in the brain. While panpsychism is a promising solution to the hard problem of consciousness for some philosophers, others remain skeptical of its plausibility and scientific validity.
Disappointing statements about consciousness research
During his TED talk, Chalmers acknowledged that due to limitations in technology, the current conditions may not be conducive for further research on consciousness. He suggested that researchers could possibly allocate their resources towards more significant areas of study.
After his statement, there were various reactions on social media. Some individuals were disappointed by his comments, whereas others strongly opposed his viewpoint.
One of the users wrote: I don’t think that research into human consciousness will ever end, so I would not necessary go to the extreme of saying technology cannot go any further into the research of human consciousness. I think science has shocked everyone throughout the years and that the impossible has been made possible in many cases. Just because something has not been done yet, does not mean it cannot ever be done. True, it may seem impossible, but we can never know until its proven to be possible.
Consider these two arguments
The first argument concerns a hypothetical scenario involving Mary, a scientist who is knowledgeable about the physical world and the brain, but has never experienced color due to being confined in a black-and-white room her entire life. The argument proposes that when Mary eventually leaves the room and experiences color for the first time, she gains new knowledge about color that she was unable to acquire through her previous understanding of the physical world. This implies that there are aspects of consciousness that cannot be fully explained by physical facts alone, creating a gap between physical processes in the brain and subjective experience.
The second argument is the conceivability argument against physicalism. It suggests that it is possible to conceive of a being that is identical in every physical way to a conscious being, but lacks conscious experience. This would indicate that there is more to consciousness than just physical processes, and that physicalism, the view that everything can be reduced to physical processes, is false. The conceivability argument is based on the idea that if something is conceivable, it is at least possible, and if it is possible, then physicalism is false. This argument highlights the difficulty of explaining subjective experience in terms of objective, physical processes.
Both arguments point to the existence of an explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal, which is the primary concern of the hard problem.
Nonreductionism
Non-reductionists believe that the "explanatory gap" between physical processes in the brain and subjective experience is a challenge because they think that consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical facts alone. However, non-reductionist physicalists argue that this gap is a result of our perspective on the world, rather than the world itself. They believe that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, and that phenomenal truths are not more than physical truths, despite being different from micro-physical truths or the knowledge that Mary gains from her lectures. Non-reductionists sometimes use the unique characteristics of phenomenal concepts to explain the gap, but this approach is still a topic of debate.
Some non-reductionists reject physicalism and regard consciousness as an irreducible component of nature. They differ on how they characterize the causal relationship between consciousness and the physical world. Interactionist dualism holds that consciousness has both physical causes and physical effects, while epiphenomenalism holds that consciousness has physical causes but no physical effects. Neutral monism suggests that phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical properties, which are dispositional. Whether neutral monism counts as a version of physicalism depends on whether the categorical bases of physical properties are considered physical.
Conclusion
Panpsychism is the belief that everything in the universe has a mind or mind-like qualities. The idea is not a formal theory of mind, but rather a conjecture about how widespread the phenomenon of mind is in the universe. The concept is quite general, and raises questions about what is meant by "all things" and "mind." Some philosophers argue that every object, part of an object, or system of objects has a mind-like quality, while others are more restrictive. Panpsychists see the human mind as a unique, highly-refined instance of some more universal concept, and argue that mind in lower animals, plants, or rocks is less sophisticated and complex than that of human beings. While some contemporary philosophers argue that panpsychism is too fantastic or improbable to be true, it has a long history in Western philosophy and is being explored in new ways in the 21st century.
References
Chalmers, D. J. 2007. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap. In Phenomenal Knowledge and Phenomenal Concepts: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.). New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-94.
Chalmers, D. J. 1995. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2: 200-19.
Anil K Seth (2007) Models of consciousness. Scholarpedia, 2(1):1328.
Further reading
Alter, T. and Walter, S. 2007. Phenomenal Knowledge and Phenomenal Concepts: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York: Oxford University Press
Shear, J. 1997. Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Velmans, M., and Schneider, S. 2007. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
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